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THEOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE
SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF*
Our era is one in which the law plays a far more important role
than at any other time in history, for the law has insinuated itself
into the control of almost every facet of man's life. If it was true over
a century ago, as Chief Justice Marshall said, that "the judicial depart-
ment comes home in its effects to every man's fireside; it passes on his
property, his reputation, his life, his all,"' it is even more true today as
the law has continued to proliferate its influence over an ever-widen-
ing range of human conduct. But it is precisely because the law has
become such a dominant factor in life that profound questions about
its nature have arisen for which the everyday conceptions of law do
not provide us with adequate answers.
The dramatic events of recent history which have focused attention
again upon the question of law, particularly the rise of totalitarianism,
reveal not only the decisive effect of the regime of law upon human
life and destiny but also the impotence of contemporary legal theory to
cope with the "lawlessness" of law. Even in calmer days, Holmes
argued that "theory is the most important part of the dogma of the
law,' 2 a view grimly corroborated by one of the great legal minds of
modern times, Gustav Radbruch, who, looking back upon the debacle of
his country wrote that "the inherited conception of law, the legal
positivism that ruled unchallenged among German legal scholars for
decades and taught that 'law is law'-this view was helpless when
confronted with lawlessness in a statutory form. For the adherents of
this view any statute however unjust had to be treated as law."'3 In
the very same essay in which he extolled the need for legal theory,
Holmes gave a definition of law that bears all the fatal infirmities
Radbruch saw in German legal positivism, for Holmes' realistic con-
ception of law defined as "the prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, '4 is just as incapable of discrim-
inating between the "just" and "unjust" law. Lurking behind Holmes'
definition of law as simply a "prophecy of what the courts will do"
was a portentous theoretical premise, namely, that a legal theory is
not obliged to provide any basis for determining the "justice" or the
* Chairman, Department of Philosophy, and Lecturer in Jurisprudence in
the Law School, Vanderbilt University.
1. Chief Justice John Marshall, in the course of the debates of the Virginia
State Convention of 1829-30, cited by Justice Sutherland in O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1933).
2. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897).
3. Radbruch, Die Erneuerung des Rechts, in 2 DiE WAnLuNa 9, cited in
Fuller, American Legal Philosophy, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 483-84 (1954).
4. Holmes, supra note 2, at 461.
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"injustice" of a law. This premise has become so fundamental in mod-
ern jurisprudence that Hans Kelsen, the most influential legal theorist
of our day, argues in his major treatise that "the concept of law has
no moral connotations whatsoever."8
The separation of law from moral and religious elements has been
considered by many a great triumph of the modern scientific intellect.
In this vein, Sir Henry Maine wrote that "the severance of law from
morality, and of religion from law, [belongs] ... very distinctly to the
later stages of mental progress. ' 6 Even more explicitly, John Chipman
Gray argued that "the gain in its fundamental conceptions which
jurisprudence made during the last century was the recognition of
the truth that the law of the state or other organized body is not an
ideal; but something which actually exists. It is not that which is in
accordance with religion or nature, or morality; it is not that which
ought to be but that which is."'7 The truth of these statements lies in
the fact that there is a difference between a legal order, a system of
morality and a set of religious beliefs. But it does not follow from
any kind of logic that the legal order does not contain elements of
moral and religious beliefs. Indeed, it is because modern positivistic
jurisprudence has defined law as having "no moral connotation what-
soever" that it has obscured the very meaning of law. To be sure,
the object behind the formulation of the "pure" theory of law is to
rid the definition of law of political and subjective ideological ingredi-
ents. That ideology moves into the content of law cannot be questioned.
For example, Professor Panunzio declared in his inaugural lecture
that "we must 'Fascize' the instruction of law .... Instruction in the
theory of law is like instruction in religion."8 And even the Marxists,
whose chief criticism of bourgeois law is that it is simply the instru-
ment of ideology, have begun to reconstruct law along ideological lines:
"The Soviet Courts" writes Gintsburg, "were designed to render spe-
cific 'class justice'... [they] are called upon to carry out the policy of
the soviet government and communist party as well as the Marx-Lenin
Doctrine."9 Recognizing that a system of law can embody ideology in
its most pathological form, does it follow that legal theory must isolate
the phenomenon of law absolutely from moral and religious elements?
Is it even theoretically possible to define law without taking into con-
sideration its moral and theological aspects? It is important, for scien-
tific reasons, to be able to distinguish law from other modes by which
human conduct is controlled; still, the jurist's chief concern should
5. KELSEN, THE GENRAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 5 (1945).
6. MAn;E, ANcE LAw 15 (2d Amer. ed. 1874).
7. GRAY, THE NATURE AND THE SOURCES OF THE LAW 94 (2d ed. 1921); cf.
Brecht, The Myth of Is and Ought, 54 HARV. L. REv. 811 (1941).
8. In Steiner, The Fascist Conception of Law, 36 CoLum. L. REV. 1267, 1271
30, 34 (1936).
9. Cf. Gsovski, The Soviet Concept of law, 7 FORDHAm L. REV. 1, 12 (1938).
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not be the preservation of certain "scientific" presuppositions but
rather a faithful analysis of the total phenomenon of law. If it is a
presupposition of the science of law that only what can be physically
observed'0 will have a rightful place in constructing a theory of law,
then obviously there will be no place in legal theory for the concept
of justice. But this does not prove that justice is not an essential ele-
ment of law; it proves merely that legal science has no way of han-
dling the question of justice-that is, that the science of law is inca-
pable of dealing with the total phenomenon of law. On principle, the
science of law is forced to distort the meaning of law because it does
not ask "What is the full nature of law?" but asks instead, "With what
aspects of the phenomenon of law can scientific method deal?" In
this case, the scientific method is like a net which catches only some
fish while the rest escape. That the ideological content of law may be
"subjective" or "relative" and on that account unacceptable to every-
one, particularly to the jurist or theologian, does not alter the fact
that there can be no law at all without the presence of "value con-
tent." An adequate theory of law must be broad enough to deal with
all the facts relating to the phenomenon of law including the fact of
value. And it is precisely because it seeks to broaden the context
within which law is to be studied that theology is so urgently con-
cerned with jurisprudence.
The questions raised by theology strike at the most significant prob-
lems of jurisprudence. To formulate these problems and to indicate
the intimate relation between theology and jurisprudence we need to
employ some minimal definition of law. Let us assume that by the
term law we mean at least that law is (1) a consciously formulated
norm of behavior, (2) enforced by the power of the state, and (3)
directed toward achieving certain ends.
This definition raises the three fundamental problems of juris-
prudence corresponding to the three parts of the definition. To say, in
the first place, that law is a consci6usly formulated norm of behaviour
means that there is no law until some idea prescribing a specific
mode of human behavior is articulated. The critical problem arises
when the question is asked, where did this idea or norm for human
behavior come from? Which also involves the question, what are
the grounds for the "validity" of the idea which is articulated in the
form of a command? That is, is law in its first aspect a matter of
arbitrary government command, or is it a product of custom, or is it
derived from nature, or is it in some way derived from God? These
10. E.g., Kelsen argues that the 'theory of the priority [i.e. prior to positive
law] of rights is untenable from a logical point of view.... The fact that an
individual has a right or has no right to possess a thing cannot be seen or heard
or touched .... There can be no legal rights before there is law." KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 79 (1945) (Emphasis added.)
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questions provoke the first problem which has to do with the Source
of Law. In the second place, to say that law is a norm enforced by the
state raises the crucial question concerning the role of force in the
phenomenon of law. Although law does not exist apart from the
element of force, does this mean that the essential element, or the
essence of law (Holmes' ultima ratio) is force? In a fundamental way
this part of our definition raises the second problem, namely, what is
the Nature of Law? In the third place to say that law is directed to-
ward achieving certain ends is to say that law is inevitably involved
in deliberating over, choosing and supporting certain values. The broad
question raised here is, what is the purposive End of Law? Thus the
theologian in jurisprudence is concerned with the problems of the
source, nature and end of Law.
THE SOURCE OF LAW
Every legal theory is constructed upon some conception of the source
of law. It would appear that the question about the source of
law is quite academic since everybody knows that its source is
either the legislator or the official ruler. But it turns out that this
question is fundamental because it is another way of asking also "what
is the validity of the law?" Here again, it might be argued that there
is only one kind of valid law in the strict sense of the word, and that
is the law which is officially and properly enacted. Yet it is precisely
the official law which can raise the most fundamental problems for
man. Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham's case 1 was dealing with an
official act of Parliament when he argued that a law which is contrary
to common right or reason is void, an argument used centuries earlier
by Plato when he said that "no law or ordinance whatever has the right
to sovereignty over true knowledge."' More recently Justice Cardozo
made the same point when he wrote that "What we are seeking is not
merely the justice that one receives when his rights and duties are
determined by the law as it is; what we are seeking is the justice to
which law in its making should conform,"'13 thus suggesting that there
is a source of law prior even to the legislator or judge. This brings us
directly to the central issue in jurisprudence, which is whether law
is to be understood solely in its positive terms or whether the whole
legal system must be viewed from some critical perspective. While
theology has not spoken, and today does not speak, with a clear and
11. The Case of the College of Physicians, 8 Co. 114a, 2 Brownl. 255 (C.P.
1610). Cf. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HAnv. L. REV.
30, 34 (1926).
12. Also, for Plato every law had to have two parts, the substantive part and
the preamble, where the preamble was to provide the rational and moral
justification of the substance. See PLATO'S LAws, 722 D-723 B (Jowrett ed.
1892); CALHOUN, INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LEGAL SCIENCE 82-83 (1944).
13. CARDOZO, THE GRowTH OF THE LAw 87 (1924).
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decisive voice on this problem, it does provide a perspective for juris-
prudence because of what it has to say about both legal positivism and
the doctrine of natural law.
A. Positivism
The major theologians accepted certain aspects of legal positivism
even though none of them absolutely repudiated the doctrine of
natural law. Where they differed was in the degree to which they
would invoke the natural law against the existing positive law. St.
Augustine was led by his realistic interpretation of human nature to
see the folly of expecting sinful man to create perfect laws and a
perfect society, and Luther appeared to have an almost uncritical
acceptance of the state. But there is a direct thread of thought which
contains classical and Christian views about man and law running
through Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin and today in Brunner and
Niebuhr. In spite of the major differences in these theologians, which
we shall indicate later, they stand united against the basic premise of
legal positivism.
The groundwork of modern positivistic legal theory was laid by
Thomas Hobbes. His notion that "there can be no unjust law" was the
logical outcome of his account of the source of law. When he wrote
that "laws are the rules of just and unjust; nothing being reputed
unjust, that is not contrary to some law, '14 he made it impossible for
any statute to be unjust. The theoretical basis of this notion is that for
Hobbes there are no moral principles which precede the law; the
creation of law and of morality occur simultaneously. There is no
perspective from which to criticize law, for there is no law of nature
behind the positive law, only the natural law of preservation. There
is in Hobbes' theory, moreover, a pessimistic view of man which is
far more uncreative than the theological doctrine of sin, for it con-
siders man so irretrievably selfish and predatory that he must be
restrained by the absolute authority of the state. Hobbes' account of
the lawlessness of the "state of nature" is the decisive element of his
account of the source of law, for by lawlessness in this state he means
not only the absence of positive law but the absence of man's awareness
of an order of right. Thus, as Hobbes traces back the source of law to
its origin, he arbitrarily stops with the fiction of the social contract as
the starting point of all law. This had the effect of forcing a decisive
breach between theology and jurisprudence for it now made man's
experience of grace, his confrontation with God through the historic
revelation in Christ, irrelevant for the legal system. When Christians
objected that the positive law might force them to compromise their
faith, Hobbes made the severe rejoinder that in that case the Christian
14. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN, C. XXVi.
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must "go to Christ in martyrdom."' 5 But the rigid positivism of Hobbes
prevailed, was later embedded into jurisprudence by Jeremy Bentham
and John Austin, and stands today as the most formidable theory of
law, finding its most elaborate expression in the work of Hans Kelsen.
Like Hobbes, Kelsen is concerned with providing a theory of the
source of law, for in this way he attempts to provide a clearer definition
of law. The key to Kelsen's system is the word "normativism."'16 All
laws are norms. If what we call a law is not a norm then it is not a
law. What then is a norm? A norm is "an impersonal command."
From whence does this norm come? Every norm derives from another
norm. That is to say, the legal system is a hierarchy of norms whose
regress can be traced back finally to the "basic norm," and beyond
that there is nothing. The "basic norm" is ultimately the source of
all laws; it is the starting point of the norm-creating process. The
basic norm is a hypothetical assumption; more specifically, it is the
norm which authorizes the historically first legislator. The function of
the basic norm is to confer law-creating power upon the first legislator
and on all the other acts based upon the first act. In Kelsen's theory,
everything depends upon this last statement; for, every norm, i.e.,
every law, is valid only insofar as it is based upon the basic norm, or,
subsequently, upon some other norm which issued from the basic
norm. The crucial problem then is to designate the character of the
basic norm.
Kelsen likens the basic norm to the transcendental logical principles
of cognition which are not empirical laws but merely the conditions
of all experience. So, too, the basic norm is itself no positive rule be-
cause it has been made, but is simply presupposed as the condition of
all positive legal norms. The final presupposition is not, for example,
the first constitution, but the validity of that constitution. The final
postulate is that at a given time in history there existed a condition
which validated the first constitution-that condition, not itself an
act or statute, is the basic norm. Thus, from the basic norm there
emerges a valid and authorized constitution. From the constitution
there emerge types of law, for example, the civil and criminal law.
The criminal law, for example, in turn produces a specific statute;
and from that statute specific decisions are arrived at by the court
affecting individuals. The sequence here is from norm to norm, from
law to law. For, the constitution, criminal law, statute and decision
are each norms and constitute the hierarchy of norms. The only cri-
terion for the validity of a law is that it must have been produced by
some superior law in the legal hierarchy. This does not mean, says
Kelsen, that laws are deduced logically from higher norms: rather,
15. HOBBEs, DE CrvE c. xviii, pt. 13.
16. See Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L. Q. REv. 474 (1934).
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just as one cannot tInow the empirical world from the transcendental
logical principles bit merely by means of them, so positive law cannot
be derived from the basic norm but can merely be understood by it.
Fundamentally, this means that norms do not in any way correspond
to Reality but derive their ultimate validity simply from proper
enactment. Kelsen puts this central point in these words:
The norms of positive law are valid; that is, they ought to be obeyed,
not because they are, like the laws of natural law derived from nature,
God, or reason, from a principle of absolutely good, right or just, from
an absolutely supreme value or fundamental norm which itself is clothed
with the claim of absolute validity, but merely because they have been
created in a certain way or made by a certain person. This implies no
categorical statement as to the value of the method of law-making or of
the person functioning as the positive legal authority; this value is a
hypothetical assumption.17
Also, the basic norm "is presupposeed to be valid because without
this presupposition no human act could be interpreted as a legal,
especially as a norm-creating, act.' 18
While theology would grant much of what Kelsen has to say
about the source of law, it would point out that his positivism is not
based completely upon positivism, and insofar as it is, it supplies us
with a grotesque conception of law. It is quite true, as Kelsen argues,
that law proliferates within the structural framework of civil govern-
ment, but this could mean that absolutely any act officially done has
the character of "law." Since the lesser norms are not derived by
logical consistency from the higher ones, there is no check on the
kind of laws passed. The validity of laws rests solely upon their
being properly enacted. Yet in actual fact Kelsen's system rests upon
a natural law presupposition, for the basic norm, Kelsen holds, "is not
valid because it has been created in a certain way, but its validity is
assumed by virtue, of its content. It is valid, then, like a norm of
natural law, apart from its merely hypothetical validity. The idea of
a pure positive law, like that of natural law, has its limitation."'19 With
this admission, it seems that a considerable alteration is made in the
force of Kelsen's theory. All that he can now say is that "law is law,"2 0
or, once a legal order is legitimized, every law it spawns is valid. But
17. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 394 (1945).
18. Id. at 116.
19. Id. at 401.
20. Pashukanis recounts Offner's critical estimate of Kelsen's theory in the
form of a caricature of a jurist addressing the legislator: 'What laws you
should enact we do not know. Concerning that we are not disturbed-it relates
to an art foreign to us; to the art of the legislator. Enact what statutes you
wish. Only when you shall have enacted some statute will we explain to you,
in Latin, what statute you have enacted." Pashukanis, Theory of Law and
Marxism, in SOvET LEGAL PHILosoPHY 115 (Babb & Hazard ed. 1951).
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since the system rests upon some natural law-like premise, a principle
of validity of a moral nature is already built into the system, however
minimal this principle may be. At the same time, Kelsen retains
Hobbes' fundamental notion that there is no theoretical relation
between morality (or Reality) and law,21 chiefly because there are
no mala in se, only mala prohibita, since an act is a malum only be-
cause it is prohibitum.2 2 Thus Kelsen desires not only to distinguish
law and morality but to go further and say that while we can know
something about law, as he has defined it, we cannot have any knowl-
edge of "good" or "justice." The essence of law then becomes "coercive
force"23 resting upon the community's "monopoly of force." According
to this theory any and every actual system of law has the same valid-
ity and is in every sense equally law. Thus, the term law is defined
exclusively as the command of the sovereign and the scope of juris-
prudence is severely limited to law as it is, dismissing the most critical
problems of law as matters of politics and ideology.
B. Natural Law
From the theological point of view, the whole idea of law is incom-
prehensible apart from a consideration of the status of man in the
nature of things. Law is made possible by man's capacity to reflect
upon his responsibility to others as well as to himself. That is, man is
able to transcend his own and the collective conduct and perceive the
difference between the "is" and the "ought" in that conduct. This
awareness of ought is the primary datum in law regardless of the
form law takes. The usual distinction between positive law and
natural law is at this point irrelevant for the consciousness of ought
is common to both. It is not possible to conceive of a positive law which
does not emerge from a conscious awareness of how somebody ought
to behave. The fashioning of this awareness into a statute and its
promulgation come later, but there would be nothing to promulgate
without this idea of how somebody should behave. This is to say that
there could be no law without the consciousness of real alternative
ways for men to act. Real freedom must inhere in the nature of man,
which makes possible the problems which law seeks to correct. At the
same time, the ground of law lies in man's awareness of his or his
neighbor's deviation from some essential structure of being or mode
of conduct to which the law seeks to restore him. At this level, the
matrix of law is identical with that of ethics, for the law springs from
man's moral constitution.
In pursuing the source of law through the moral consciousness
21. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 5, 114 (1945); for an excep-
tion to this see KELSEN, op. cit. supra at 131.
22. Id. at 52, 78-79.
23. Id. at 36.
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theology seeks to go beyond the usual treatments of legal positivism
to some more fundamental source. It is perfectly true that the law as
it emerges from his moral consciousness is affected by man's concerns
and involvements in his particular society and community, by time
and place. That is, custom has a great influence upon the formulation
of law as well as ethics. But it is also a fact that custom itself comes
under criticism, for man can transcend the current custom by grasping
some higher responsibility than the current law may embody. Thus,
custom may lie behind positive enactment as a source of law, but it
cannot, as Savigny and Puchta thought, the fundamental source of law.
The essential insight of theology regarding the source of law is that
it lies in the very ordering agency of reality. While man possesses
vast freedom in conduct, neither his nature nor the nature around him
is without some essential form. The ground of man's value and his
rights as a person derive from his embodying some mode of purpose.
And the coming together of man in society is not a product of man's
decision alone but the necessary consequence of his nature. Just why
man, whose nature is explained in terms of purpose and a natural need
for society, needs law to bind him in brotherhood is seen in theology
not only as the consequence of his ignorance but also in the peculiar
recalcitrance that is made possible by his essential nature, his freedom.
The explanation of how man emerges and continues to exist is the clue
to the source of law, for man cannot be understood when disengaged
from the ground of his being. Every school of theology is at one on
this matter though great differences ensue when particular explana-
tions are made.
St. Augustine is the pivotal theologian of law for he is at once the
source of Christian natural law theory as well as the tradition, particu-
larly characteristic of the Reformation and some contemporary theolo-
gians, which condemns the presumptuousness of natural law doctrine.
That St. Augustine affected such diverse traditions is explained chiefly
by the fact that he brought together in a peculiar balance the classical
Greek view of natural law and the biblical view of God's grace. Thus
St. Augustine posed the problem so urgent for contemporary man,
which is to understand the relation between the necessities of contin-
gent history and the life which God's grace raises as a possibility. More
specifically, like St. Paul, St. Augustine admitted man's capacity to
know what his duty to his fellow man is through natural reason, but
pointed out that no static rational ethical norm can do justice to the
infinite modes in which human beings encounter each other. This
meant that Augustine saw the limitations of positive morality and
positive law when viewing man in his essential nature, namely, in his
capacity to love. But Augustine did not on that account consider law
and love as unrelated, as though the spheres of nature and grace bear
19571
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no relation to each other. The intimate relation between love and
law in the human sphere is the consequence of the coalescence of
these modes in God. In human history this means that there is a
constant tension between the positive law and the demands of love,
between jurisprudence and theology. Neither man nor any of his
institutions ever overcome the critical force of the judgment of love;
but likewise, the redemptive power of love affects not only man but
also his institutions. It is quite instructive that while St. Augustine
took a very realistic view of the state, it was not the state he had in
mind when he spoke of the civitate terrana, just as it was not the
church he had in mind when he spoke of the civitate Dei; this suggests
that since the civitate Dei is within society the higher ethic of love can
have some bearing even upon the structures of law if those fashioning
it love God.
From Augustine, Aquinas lifted chiefly the rational element of law,
taking as his starting point Augustine's statement that "that law which
is supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise then un-
changeable and eternal."24 From this, Aquinas built a very neat
doctrine of the source of law where the human, positive law, if it is
valid, comes from the natural law, while the natural law is derived
from the eternal law. By eternal law, Aquinas meant God's eternal
reason which orders the whole universe. By natural law he meant that
part of the eternal law which man's reason can grasp and which
pertains to his life and institutions. By human law he meant the
positive law, which is necessary because man does not automatically
behave in such a way as to fulfill his nature. But Aquinas went so far
as to say that if the positive law was contrary to the natural law, it did
not have to be obeyed, for then it "was not a law, but a perversion of
law."
Behind this Thomistic doctrine of natural law lies a very optimistic
theory of knowledge which assumes that the human intellect can
begin by abstracting the notion of being from objects experienced and
arrive at the notion of an ultimate Being. Moreover, through the
device of analogy, the intellect can understand the nature of God and
can conclude that man and God differ only in that their mode of exist-
ence differs. That is, God's essential nature is rational and so is man's,
which means that man knows what God knows but not as much, since
man is finite and contingent. Man's natural reason can "participate"
in God's reason, and insofar as God's reason is the eternal law, man
has a direct knowledge of that law which in its limited human form
is natural law. Thus man possesses the equipment for a natural
morality and a natural justice. He is able to perceive the purpose and
order in institutions. A careful reading of Aquinas' Treatise on Law
24. AQUINAS, SUmmA THEOLOGICA, la, Ilae, Q. 91, art. 1.
THEOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE
indicates that he took into consideration the ambiguities of the human
mind caused by self-interest and laziness and indicated the role of
God's grace in the full understanding of law. Nevertheless, the out-
come of this theory of natural law was the constantly treacherous
experience of ascribing to contingent cases ultimate and immutable
solutions. But this is not an argument against natural law as much as
it is a limitation or perversion of it.
Calvin took a fundamentally different view of man's rational ca-
pacity, having in mind the more biblical insights of St. Augustine.
"Human reason," said Calvin, "neither approaches, nor tends, nor di-
rects its views toward this truth, to understand who is the true God,
or in what character he will manifest himself to us."25 He argued that
"the mind of man is so completely alienated from the righteousness
of God, that it conceives, desires, and undertakes everything that is
impious, perverse, base, impure and flagitous: that his bent is so
thoroughly infected by the poison of sin, that it cannot produce any-
thing but what is corrupt.... The mind always remains involved in
hypocrisy and fallacious obliquity."26 Of the Biblical doctrine that
God created man in his image, Calvin says that "although we allow
that the Divine Image was not utterly annihilated and effaced in him,
yet it was so corrupted that whatever remains is but horrible de-
formity."27
Yet, this did not mean that Calvin entirely repudiated the doctrine
of natural law. He could write that: "We perceive in the minds of all
men general impressions of civil probity and order. Hence it is that
not a person can be found who does not understand that all associations
of men ought to be governed by laws, or who does not conceive in his
mind the principles of those laws."28 What Calvin did was to shift the
focus from man's reason to his conscience (a somewhat ambiguous
move since he speaks of "conscience which has been engraven on the
minds of men"). The distinctive view of Calvin here seems to be that
natural law is not constructed by human nature expressing itself
rationally, but that it is a law imposed from without by God. Hence
Calvin says, "our conscience does not permit us to sleep in perpetual
insensibility, but is an internal witness and monitor of the duties we
owe to God, shows us the difference between good and evil and so
accuses us when we deviate from our duty."29
The distinction between the Thomistic and Calvinistic theories of
natural law is a distinction between two theological interpretations of
the source of law. The first is God as Eternal Reason and the other is
25. CALVIN. THE INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, bk. II, c. 2, § 18.
26. Id. at bk. II, c. 5, § 19.
27. Id. at bk. I. c. 15, § 4.
28. Id. at bk. 1f, c. 2, § 13.
29. Id. at bk. II, c. 8, § 1.
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God as Creative Will. In the first, there is a more static conception of
the eternal rational forms which the human reason can grasp in some
measure, whereas in the second the dynamic will of God is known
through faith. This distinction lies at the difference between contem-
porary theologians who write about law. Niebuhr does not, in spite of
his criticism of it, deny the essential premise of natural law theory,
for he does not deny that in the last analysis we look to our understand-
ing of God to understand the nature of man. What Niebuhr does say
is that we cannot derive a valid natural law which rests solely on the
rational capacity of man, even though this human reason talks about
God, for the limitations of human reason create limitations of our un-
derstanding of God. Nevertheless, Niebuhr does see some essential
universal structure in the human moral constitution when he says
that: "The practical universality of the prohibition of murder, for
instance, in the moral codes of mankind is just as significant as the
endless relativities which manifest themselves in the practical applica-
tion of the general prohibition. There are essential universal principles
of justice .... 3" Moreover Niebuhr says "it is important to recognize
the validity of principles of justice, rationally conceived, as sources of
criticism for the historical achievements of justice." He considers Karl
Barth's notion that without the introduction of the Ten Commandments
as guides the moral life of man would possess no valid principles of
guidance to be "as absurd as it is unscriptural." 31 Furthermore, Nie-
buhr's conviction that the positive legal order is always under the
judgment of the higher ethics of love as we know it through God's
revelation is an additional confirmation of the perspective of natural
law. This is to say, the doctrine of natural law is misconceived if it
is taken to mean only a system of ideal law which natural reason fabri-
cates. This is true not only because the distinction between reason and
revelation is not as simple as it is frequently made out to be, but
because whether the conception of a higher law is based upon reason
or revelation, in either case a perspective has been achieved for under-
standing the true ground of law. Brunner raises the question "on
what . . . is the deviation of the Christian law of nature from the
rational Law of Nature based, since both claim to be based upon
reason?" And in answer he holds that:
in actual fact the so-called law of nature is a concept of the law of nature
which has been modified by faith in the Bible, therefore it is not really
a law of "Nature," but of "creation," and its difference from the law of
nature points to the fact that faith and revelation must come to the
assistance of reason, in order to discover what is truly rational. The
30. 2 NIEBUHR, TnE NATuRE AND DESTINY OF MAN 254 (1943).
31. Ibid.




absolute Law of Nature, therefore, is based upon the fiction of a natural
reason, which in reality is a reason which is instructed by the Christian
belief in God, and by the Christian anthropology which arises from this.33
But again, for Brunner to shift the source of law to creation instead
of Reason does not alter the residual natural law premise in his theol-
ogy, for to say, as he does, that the ground of law rests ultimately upon
God's "allocation" of all elements into essential relationships and
that man can know the structure of these relations (whether through
reason or revelation) is to affirm that nature embodies, in some form
or another, the norms for law. The natural law premise in its simplest
form is that man's knowledge of the essential structure of nature yields
the norms for law. To view nature from the point of view of God's
creative act is nevertheless to have a view of nature, and the notion
of law which flows from it is a doctrine of natural law. It is just as
risky to think we know the ultimate norm of justice by analysing the
created orders as it is to think we can derive them rationally. At the
same time, Brunner's emphasis upon the notion that man's nature bears
the capacity to be addressed by God in the I-Thou encounter contains
a Christian rationalism and the natural law premise. To be sure,
Brunner explicitly states that we cannot know "in advance" what is
the command of God, but when we do know it, we have something to
say about human dignity, rights, freedom and equality, and we know
these, for the most part, dynamically instead of in static form.
It must be acknowledged that between the severe positivist for
whom the source of law rests chiefly in proper enactment, and the
Christian theologian for whom the source of law exists in the creative
and redemptive nature of God, there is the possibility of the rational,
enlightened, view of law. There can be no quarrel with Pufendorf's
notion that even if there were no God there would be a natural law,
for this theme of rationalism accords with the theological insight that
the human reason is not irrevocably perverse in spite of its constant
tendency to divinize historically relative standards. It must always
be borne in mind, too, that the triumph of legal positivism at least to
some extent rests upon the nominalism or voluntarism of such
theologians as Ockam and Luther. But the theologian would insist
that the rationalist is asking man to believe in his interpretation of
the source of justice which can be a wide variety of things, such as
the moral sentiment, custom, or the economic order. The question of
the essence of law is therefore left obscure. While the theologian
cannot offer a detailed system of law, he does see the phenomenon of
law more creatively because he sees it as related to the essential nature
of man and bearing a close relation to God's purpose for man in crea-
33. BRUNNER, THE DrvIn I PERATIVE 631 (1948).
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tion. And to understand the source of law in this way has a great deal
to do with how we shall view the nature of law.
THE NATuRE OF LAW
Because the law is enforced by the coercive power of the state, it is
frequently held that the essence of law is force. The relation of force
to law is obscured both in theology and in jurisprudence. For the
theologian, this relation is ambiguous because he views the source of
law as God who is understood in terms of love, and even though love
in this context has no sentimental connotations, its spontaneity seems
to be in flat contradiction to force. Some theologians, Barth for exam-
ple, have therefore concluded that the Christian norm of love cannot
provide law with any insight because the law is essentially a regime
of force which can bear no creative relation to love. Moreover, the
Christian ethic of love is considered by many to be relevant only in
personal relations and cannot be translated into a collective standard.
In jurisprudence, on the other hand, the necessity of defining the
specific nature of law, in order to be clear about the rules of society,
leads the jurist to argue that law is essentially those rules which have
behind them the force of the state. Thus Kelsen argues that "if we
do not conceive of law as coercive order, then we have lost the pos-
sibility of differentiation of law from other social phenomena. ... "34
This makes force the essence of law, for again, as Kelsen argues, "The
statement, a certain social order has the character of law, is a legal
order, does not imply the moral judgment that this order is good or
just. There are legal orders which are, from a certain point of view,
unjust. Law and justice are two different concepts."35 This would
mean that fascist, nazi or communist law are equally law simply
because they possess the essential element of law, namely, force.
When Holmes said that the "ultima ratio" of law is force, he had
in mind not only the notion that force is the ultimate arbiter between
inconsistent views, between dictatorship and democracy, for example.
It appears that he also meant that law is by its nature a matter of
force, particularly because he was "so skeptical as to our knowledge
of the goodness or badness of laws."36 Holmes' skepticism led Sir
Frederick Pollock to reply that "If you deny that any principles of
conduct at all are common to and admitted by all men who try to
behave reasonably-well, I don't see how you can have any ethics or
any ethical background for law."37 But this is precisely the question
legal realism and positivism provoke, namely, whether law is "essen-
tially" a matter of force or whether its essence lies in justice.
34. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 26 (1945).
35. Id. at 5.
36. A HoLmEs-PoLLocK LETEs 163 (Howe ed. 1941).
37. Id. at 275.
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A. Law As Force
The question at issue is not whether force is part of the phenomenon
of law, but the theoretical question of whether law is to be defined,
as it is in much modern jurisprudence, as force.
The impossibility of creating a coherent theory of law in terms of
force is illustrated by soviet jurisprudence. The struggle for law in
Russia today is really a struggle for some basis for a legal theory. The
marxist premise, which holds that legal principles are only "economic
reflexes," led to the conclusion that "law is but the will of [the economi-
cally dominant] class made into a law for all,"3 8 a conclusion which
meant a complete revolt against the very idea of law. This attack upon
law was based not only upon a revolutionary psychology couched in
such phrases as that "marxism declares a merciless war against bour-
geois legal concepts." Even the calm theoretical task of marxist
jurists led Pashukanis to write that it was not the intention of the
communists to replace bourgeois law with soviet law. Rather, Pashu-
kanis argued that "the withering away of the categories of bourgeois
law (exactly the categories, and not of this or that particular rule)
can under no circumstances mean their replacement by some new
categories of proletarian law. The withering away of law in general,
that is, the gradual disappearance of the juridical element from human
relations .. ". . 40 is what marxism seeks to achieve, or predicts will
happen. Goichbarg wrote that "we refuse to see in law an idea useful
for the working class." This breakdown of legal theory had the practi-
cal consequence that "from November 1917 to 1922, law was formally
lacking."
41
Marxism is quite right in dispensing with legal theory as well as
with pretentions of legality in practice if the essence of law is con-
ceived of as force. This follows from the elementary logic that if
you define law as force, you define not law but force. To be sure, the
marxist analysis rests upon the notion that law like morality, is
ideology. Ideology in this connection is the pretention that the inter-
ests of the economically dominant class, which are determined by the
relations of production, rest on eternal or ultimate moral principles.
To say that law is simply the embodiment of ideology caused by the
class struggle means, however, that in a classless society there would
be no law since there would, then, be no dominant class seeking to
exert its will over another class.
The soviet jurists have become aware of the need for some theory of
law to overcome this simple negation of law. But from the positivistic
38. MARx, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 28 (Henry Regnery Co. 1950).
39. Gsovski, The Soviet Concept of Law, 7 FOpmrHAM L. REv. 1. 4 (1938).
40. Cf. Pashukanis, Theory of Law and Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHIOS-
OPHY 122 (Babb & Hazard ed. 1951).
41. SCHLESINGER, SovIET LEGAL THEORY 79 (1945).
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premises from which they start and with their identification of law
with force, their jurisprudence is still incapable of producing a theory
of law. "Even today" writes Rudolph Schlesinger, "it is more difficult
in the USSR than elsewhere to establish a clear-cut distinction between
administration and legislative acts,"' 2 which means that soviet legal
theory cannot differentiate between law and an arbitrary command.
The re-instatement of soviet law today does not mean the abandonment
of the concept of law as force. The development of a system of courts
does not rest upon any concept of fundamental human rights: "[T]he
so-called private rights in Soviet Law are not actual rights of private
persons, but, rights established by the state."43 The courts are set up
not to defend private rights but to provide the government with an
organ of power "completely under the control of the vanguard of the
working class." If the law is force and the courts are simply the
agency of the "vanguard," why, asks Professor Berman, "erect this
elaborate structure of rights and procedures?" Because, in the words
of Krylenko, "a club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is more efficient,
the most efficient is the court."44 Hence, early marxism led to the
theoretical repudiation of the category of law. The current reinstate-
ment of law rests upon no new Soviet theory but rather is consistent
with the early marxism, for soviet law is self-consciously based upon
class interest as indicated in a statute which reads: "when passing a
decision upon a case, the People's Court shall apply the decrees of the
workers' and peasants' government."45 Decree has replaced law. Thus,
even though Pashukanis is discredited now as the theorist of law, the
Soviet government still follows his principle: "We need the utmost
elasticity," said Pashukanis, and so "we do not have a system of
proletarian law. '46 Insofar as there is "law," it rests upon force, which
is to say that soviet law is lawless, chiefly because, as Lenin has said,
the soviet system is a "power unrestrained by any law and based upon
force and not law."47
Thus, soviet experience gives us a good example of the breakdown
of legal theory and the impossibility of deriving a satisfactory con-
ception of law from the "imperative theory" of law which identifies
law with force. Actually, however, not even the soviet legal system
is totally insensitive to the considerations of justice. Even though
it is true that every system of law is affected by the ideological element
which causes groups to define justice in terms of their self-interest,
it is also true that there can be no law in the true sense of the word
which does not consider justice as its essence.
42. Id. at 60.
43. Id. at 95.
44. BMUVIAX, JUSTICE IN RussIA 28 (1950).
45. Gsovski, supra note 39, at 20.
46. Id. at 31.
47. Id. at 17-18.
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The theoretical problem here is created because of the notion that
the phenomenon of law has to be defined as it exists at any specific
moment. And since the particular notion of justice a system of law
may embody at that moment may be a very questionable notion
of justice indeed, the illicit conclusion is drawn that the essence of law
cannot be justice because there is no agreed upon essential justice.
But law is a dynamic phenomenon just as the life of man is. We could
not consistently hold, as it is in some quarters, that man is not essen-
tially a moral being just because no man has ever attained perfect
righteousness. The question of morality would never arise unless the
actual behavior of man deviated from some basic rightness in human
conduct and relations. Similarly, the need for law would never arise
unless the relations between people and things at any time disturbed
some essential order. We have already discussed the difficulty of dis-
cerning the content of this essential order, but it is instructive that
every system of law struggles to clarify that order. At this point,
soviet law actually takes on the character of natural law since it
presumes to use the law to create the "right" relations between all the
factors of production. But if instead of looking at the law in static
terms only we see it as a process for achieving purposes, the intimate
relation between law and justice becomes apparent. Then the idea of
justice becomes just as central to the nature of law as the idea of the
good is to the nature of man. And it is precisely because the law in
some way seeks to help man achieve the good that the law itself needs
to be informed by the good, that is, justice. Moreover, the understand-
ing of the element of force in the phenomenon of law is clarified when
we conceive of law as justice.
B. Law As Justice
Theologians have frequently looked upon "the powers that be" with-
out asking whether they were just, for those powers, after all, "are
ordained of God. ' 48 Moreover, theologians have been able to justify
the coercive power of the state in its most ruthless forms on the
grounds of man's sinfulness. Yet the fateful passage in the Book of
Romans makes it clear that the power of the state is to be obeyed not
solely because it is power, "but also for conscience' sake." That is to
say, power is put into the context of conscience, or justice. The biblical
view nowhere amounts to calling law sheer power. It does legitimize
power, but only power which follows the contours of justice. Power
is less than love, and law is less than love, just as the existential status
of man is less than his essential nature. But these all bear a relation to
each other. For, as we indicated in the previous section, the source of




be interpreted as an extension of God's creative power for it has the
effect of fashioning man by ordering his conduct. Both creation and
law are means through which power or force bring form into being.
Creation achieves the initial form of all things whereas law seeks to
restore aspects of creation to its essential form and norm from which
it has deviated. Besides restoring behavior to its essential norm, which
may indicate a static view of human nature, the law also seeks to lead
conduct in the direction of fulfilling man's potentialities, thus raising
conduct to an ever higher level of possibility, that is, closer and closer
to the requirements of love. Thus, theology views law as part of the
act of creation, and like creation, law has behind it the element of
power; but the power behind law, like the power behind creation, is
limited to the bringing into being of essential form-in neither case is
power arbitrary.
It is illuminating to see how closely the curriculum of a modem law
school mirrors this theological interpretation. For theology holds that
the original justice is man's spontaneous right relation to man and
things as well as to God. Thus, the first edition of the law lies in God's
creative act wherein He forms man to live the life of love. The second
edition of the law is the Decalogue, which is a more specific (but less
dynamic) elaboration of the life man ought to live. Whereas the life
of love would lead man to relate himself properly to his fellow man,
his actual prideful life obscures his duty and the specific instuctions of
the Commandments become necessary. Subsequently the "secular"
law follows the general direction of these commandments, though now
deprived of their theological basis. For example, "Thou shalt not steal"
is expanded into the more intricate Law of Property, "Thou shalt not
bear false witness" lurks behind the Law of Contracts, "Thou shalt
not kill" lies behind part of the Criminal Law, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery" still represents a fundamental element in the Law of
Domestic Relations. That is, law as we know it in the actual legal sys-
tem is involved in the process of creating the kind of relations God
intended in His creative act. The law is misconceived, however, if
it is seen simply as force; its essential nature is involved in working
toward relations consonant with man's essential nature. To be sure,
the coercive aspect of law cannot create the life of love, but its function
is chiefly to bring to bear those conditions which will make love
possible and at least to restrain behavior which would obstruct the
possibility of mutuality and love.
Again, however much we may see in Augustine the spirit of realism,
we nevertheless see in his theology the comprehensive unity between
the ethics of love and the phenomenon of law. His great concern for
justice in government led him to say that, "if ... a commonwealth be
an estate of the people, and that they be no people that are not united
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in one consent of the law; nor is that a law which is not grounded in
justice; then it must needs follow, where no justice is, there no com-
monwealth is."49 That is, the "rule of law" requires not bare force
but justice. And Augustine defined justice not solely as a corrective
act but rather in a way that provides a perspective for curbing totali-
tarian law on the one hand and abetting man's higher ethic on the
other. Hence, taking justice to mean the act of distributing to every-
one his due, Augustine felt the "what is due" can best be designated
in religious terms. Consequently, Augustine did not begin with
what man owes to man, but with what he owes to God. For Augustine,
justice is incomprehensible if it is limited merely to the relations be-
tween man and man-the primary relation is between man and God.
(This, I take it, is the ground of our objection to totalitarian "law" even
today.) Thus, "If man serve not God, what justice can be thought to
be in him? Seeing that if he serve not him the soul has neither lawful
sovereignty over the body nor the reason over the affections."50 What
is more, collective justice is impossible apart from this individual jus-
tice. "Now if this justice is not found in one man, no more then can
it be found in a whole multitude of such like men. Therefore, amongst
such there is not the consent of law which makes a multitude a peo-
ple."51 Again, referring to actual law, "What justice is that which takes
man from the true God?"' Augustine clearly saw the relevance of the
ethics of love to the collective life of man and indeed saw it as the
essence of justice. Love is the perspective for the fashioning and
criticizing of law. The law derives its character as law from its being
bound by love. Without the ethics of love, Augustine held that there
could be no true orderliness since nature would be disturbed by man's
willfulness. Without love there could be no justice for there would
be lacking a cogent motive, and pattern, for man to render to other
men their due. But most important of all, without love as a gift of
God's grace man could not love the proper things properly. Love
therefore becomes the essence of the law, and indeed love is the New
Law. Lest this be considered too idealistic and too remote, we need
only consider the bearing of love on law by referring to the moral
force this ethic generated against the laws of racial segregation. And
lest we consider this ethic irrelevant to the collective life of man, we
need only reflect on the fact that its repudiation made possible the
laws of segregation. This is not to say that theology wants to re-write
the whole law. It does say that the essence of law is justice and that
the ethics of love bears directly upon the formation of law as well
as on the intimate conduct of man. Even Calvin could say that "all






nations are left at liberty to enact such laws as they find to be respec-
tively expedient for them; provided that they be framed according to
that perpetual rule of love."53
THE ENDS OF LAW
The most characteristic feature of law is that it is freighted with
purpose. No system of law, however, has an unambiguous vision of the
purpose it attempts to achieve. But likewise there can be no law or
system of law which does not attempt to achieve, certain values or
goals. The concept of purpose is complex, for law seeks to achieve
many kinds of purposes, and frequently it seeks to achieve these simul-
taneously. The complexity arises from the fact that in every instance
the object of the law's concern is man, but man is at once an individual
and a member of society and also bears a relation to things. There are
values which are personal while other values are collective or social
and the law must consider both types. The value of individual freedom,
for example, needs to be viewed alongside the value of social order,
and inevitably there will be some serious interaction between these
different values. Moreover, there is the value of stability in the law,
a value which affects chiefly the judicial process where a steady con-
tinuity in the law provides a desirable predictability. At the same time,
both the individual as well as the community can gain new values from
a periodic reconception of the law's purpose. This is the reason Justice
Cardozo warned against the danger of depriving the judicial process of
its "suppleness of adaptation to varying conditions"5 and Justice
Douglas argued that in constitutional law "stare decisis must give way
before the' dynamic component of history."55 The variableness of the
law's purpose, however, does not mean either that the law is not to be
understood chiefly in terms of the purposes it seeks to achieve or that
the concept of purpose is hopelessly relative.
A. "Purpose" As a Decisive Element in Law
The concept of purpose is the key concept which differentiates the
theory of legal positivism from natural law theories. But ideas of pur-
pose are so dominant in law that even the juristic theories which would
repudiate the assumptions of natural law are bound by the purposive
element, a good example of which is found in Jeremy Bentham.
Bentham leveled a devastating attack upon the theory of natural
rights, implying that it is not the purpose of law to protect such non-
existent rights:
All this talk about nature, natural rights, natural justice and injustice
53. Calvin, op. cit. supra note 25, at bk. IV. c. 20 § 15.
54. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936).
55. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLumt. L. Rnv. 735, 737 (1949).
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proves two things only, the heat of passions, and the darkness of under-
standing . . . . "Property the creature of law?--Oh, no-Why not?-be-
cause if it were the law that gave everything, then law might take away
everything: if everything were given by law, so might everything be
taken away.
The case is that in a society in any degree civilized, all the rights a
man can have, all the expectation he can entertain of enjoying anything
that is said to be his is derived solely from the law.
.... Till law existed, property could scarcely be said to exist. Property
[as well as all other rights] and law were born together and die together.
56
Not the protection but the creation of rights is the way Bentham saw
the function of law. But even though Bentham would add to the state's
monopoly of the administration of the law the other monopoly of the
creation of law, he could not thereby divest the law of its purposive
aspect. Indeed, he accentuates this purposive element, for now what-
ever values society will achieve derive from the purposive ideas of the
legislator. Since rights and duties spring first from the law, the law is
the matrix of purpose, both individual and collective. That is, Bentham
assumes that the way man ought to behave is determined not by
"nature" or "natural justice" but by the law. But to argue this way
is to assume that the law is some abstract machine independent of the
rational consciousness of man. Bentham held that human reason
could not produce any natural rights, only a "bastard brood of
monsters."
Actually, Bentham's theory of law is a natural law theory, for the
law, as he sees it, derives its guidance from the nature of man. The
end of law, or the purpose of law is for Bentham not just any end
(even though he argued that "push-pin is as good as poetry"); though
the law creates the norms of behavior, the legislator is guided by the
nature of man in fashioning the law. This is a rational theory of law,
for it presumes that the nature of man can be known and that the
essential element in human nature is universal. Moreover, Bentham
achieved his great influence upon both legal theory and practice by
insisting that jurisprudence must rest upon his conception of man,
i.e., upon utilitarianism. For, to describe law in terms of utilitarianism
is to provide a "language [which will] serve as a glossary by which all
systems of positive law might be explained, while the matter serves as
a standard by which they might be tried."57 For one who follows in the
tradition of Hobbes and the empiricism of Hume, it is also noteworthy
that Bentham should say that: "There is no form, or colour, or visible
trace, by which it is possible to express the relation which constitutes
property [or any other rights]. It belongs not to physics, but to meta-
.r6. EWTANT . THE LIMITS OF JTM"IPRUDENCE DEFINED 84 (Everett ed. 1945).
57. HALEvY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALIsm 63 (1928).
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physics: it is altogether a creature of the mind."58 Thus, the purpose of
law is to satisfy the nature of man, a nature which can be understood
rationally and a nature from which the "ought" for law can be lifted.
While Bentham enumerates the purposes of law as being "to provide
subsistence, to aim at abundance, to encourage equality and to maintain
security, '59 the whole enterprise is reducible to the simple formula of
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. For, Bentham argues that
"nature has placed man under the empire of pleasure and pain" and
that "we owe to them all our ideas, we refer to them all our judgments,
and all the determination of our life.160 The purpose of law, then, is
to order the conduct and relations of men in such a way as to minimize
pain and maximize pleasure and thus achieve the greatest happiness
of the greatest number. That is, the purpose of law is dictated by the
nature of man.
Bentham's thought illustrates the impossibility of thinking about
law without having some conception of the ends of law. Moreover,
the ends of law are in every case determined by our conceptions of
human nature. Thus, juristic systems which begin by denouncing
morals and by refusing to allow the relation between law and morals
frequently end simply by substituting a new morality. Not only is this
true in Bentham's case, it is also true in soviet law, whose function,
says Golyakov, is "the fundamental remaking of the conscience of the
people."6' 1 The question then is no longer whether the doctrine of man
is fundamental in determining the purposive element in law, but
rather what conception of man is to be used.
B. Theology and the Ends of Law
Few theologians would insist that the purpose of law should be de-
duced entirely from the Christian interpretation of man. Aquinas
argued that the function of law is to achieve the "common good," for
he followed Aristotle's notion that "lawgivers make men good by
habituating them to good works." Earlier, Augustine had seen in the
positive law the agency whereby the disruptive behaviour of anarchic
man was subdued, for "when the power to do hurt is taken from the
wicked they will carry themselves better being curbed.162 In a
similar way, Luther looked to law chiefly as the means of achieving a
minimal order. But Calvin looked to law for far broader purposes,
saying that:
civil government is designed as long as we live in this world, to cherish
and support the external worship of God, to preserve the pure doctrine
58. Id. at 47.
59. Cf. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY 115 (3d ed. 1953).
60. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, C. 1 (2d ed. 1830).
61. Cf. Gsovski, supra note 39, at 16.
62. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, bk. XIX, c. 21.
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of religion, to defend the constitution of the church, to regulate our lives
in a manner requisite for the society of man, to form our manners to civil
justice, to promote our concord with each other and to establish general
peace and tranquility.
6 3
Calvin goes much further than any contemporary theologian would
seem to follow him, for here he almost accords to the civil law the
function of perfecting human life; in another place he had said more
explicitly that "the law inculcates a conformity of life, not only to
external probity, but also to internal and spiritual righteousness."
64
On the whole, Karl Barth presents a view closer to Luther's than to
Calvin's, though he can be identified with neither since his chief
insight here seems to be almost this: theology does not look for the
law to be shaped to fit the Christian view of man-it only asks that
the state give the church the freedom to preach the gospel.6 Even
Emil Brunner who has self-consciously sought to formulate a dis-
tinctively Protestant theology of law resists, in the end, any attempt
to use the Christian ethics of love as the basis of the law, for, again,
he sees law as dealing with impersonal relations while love is the
ethics of personal encounter. At this point he resembles the Reformers
for whom, as he has said, "the connection between justice and love was
not made clear .... -66 This negative drift in theology regarding the
purpose of law led Ernst Troeltsch to comment that in the past the
Church has sought to Christianize the state in such an indirect way
that "all that this 'Christianization' amounted to in the end was that
everything was left outwardly as it had been before."
67
A more creative relation between the Christian view of man to the
purposes of law must be asserted. We have argued that the whole
concept of law gets its deepest meaning when understood in the con-
text of man's full nature when viewed in relation to how man ought
to live as required by his essential nature. The purpose of law must
be affected by the purpose of man, for the functioning of law will
have a concrete bearing upon the conduct and even the motives of man.
The law can determine at many points whether there will be any
possibility for man to live according to his essential nature. If the
theological view of man has no bearing upon the law, then it has no
bearing upon the life of man. It is true that the law deals chiefly with
the outward acts of man whereas the ethics of love strikes at the
inner life. Nevertheless, it is intolerable to hold that for the purposes
63. 4 CALvIN, op. cit. supra note 25, at bk. IV, c. 20, § 2.
64. Id. at bk. II, c. 8, § 6.
65. BARTH, AGAINST THE STREAm passim (1954); cf. 2 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND
DEsTINY OF MAx 279 (1943); also, ELLUL, LE FoNDEMENT THEOLOGIQUE fu DRorr
81 (1946).
66. BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 263 n. 5 (1945).




of law, man's essential nature must be considered as governed chiefly
by self-interest, while for the purposes of personal ethics his nature
should be defined in terms of love. On this point, Bentham was clearer
and more consistent than those theologians who do not build their
theory of law upon man's essential nature, for he brought about a
specific reformation of the law of England simply by insisting that the
law should conform to the ethical nature of man.
Thus, various forms of utilitarianism and pragmatism have supplied
the law with its value content chiefly because theology has rather
consistently disengaged its more important insights from the theoreti-
cal treatment of law. It seems far more consistent to hold that human
institutions, insofar as they are the products of human acts, come under
the same kind of critical judgment as the individual does. As the re-
demptive quality of love seeks to transform human life, so also its
force can affect institutions. And this is peculiarly true in the case
of law inasmuch as the law can so specifically abet or frustrate the
demands of Christian love. The idea of love is no more abstract and
void of content than the notion of "pleasure and pain." Moreover,
creative love is far more clearly a standard of "ought" than is the
pleasure-pain calculus. To say that men tend to seek their own
pleasure does not mean that they "ought" to. Yet, Bentham and Mill
not only made happiness the standard, they even went so far as to
give to the legislator the task of defining the contents of this happiness,
thus making the law the instrument for moralizing man. Moreover,
the ethics of self-interest, which at first expressed itself in individual-
ism and a laissez-faire attitude by the government, gradually resulted
in collectivism since the government now undertook to educate man to
his self-interest and to create the conditions of his happiness. While
it would take us too far afield to elaborate in detail how the ethic of
love could clarify the ends of law, some indication can be given of how
love becomes relevant to the ends of law.
Since the ends of law grow out of a general view of what man is
striving for, the standard of Christian love, when defined and expressed
in its full nature would provide a basis for the more specific ends of
law. If the essential nature of man is love, which on the collective
scale means brotherhood, then love provides a very specific insight
into the manner in which society ought to be organized. This is not
a utopian idealism but the concrete ethics of mutual concern. Its power
flows from the conviction that brotherhood or fellowship is not only
a primary need of man but that the ethics of love alone can produce
it in its most creative form. What this means for the law is that the
end of law must not be simply order, for order can turn out to be
established disorder when considered from the point of view of how
man ought to be related to his fellow man. Whenever the law divides
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races or groups against each other and creates a condition which frag-
ments the human community, the end of law is as sinful as the motives
which lie behind its formulation. Moreover, the ethics of love has the
effect of treating men as persons and not simply as things or objects
to be manipulated. Thus, the impact of Christian love is to clarify the
nature of social order so as to create those conditions which make
brotherhood possible. The law cannot put the quality of love into the
behavior of men, but it can create conditions which can make the ethic
of love impossible. When Christian ethics becomes operative in the
legal sphere, as it did during the rise of modern liberal democracy, it
acts as a fundamental restraint upon power and control chiefly
through its theological element. The law, when it recognizes that man
possesses a purpose which he derives not only from nature or the
state but from God, is limited in what it can legitimately impose upon
man. Totalitarian law would thus be thoroughly inconsistent with
Christian ethics, for it would claim from man an allegiance which can
be rendered legitimately only to God; it could also seek to force him
to break the bond of fellowship with his neighbor, an act the Christian
ethic would have to criticize. The ethic of utilitarianism could not
supply the basis for resistance or criticism, for on principle the gov-
ernment would have the right to define the meaning of happiness. But
no government can consistently alter the essence of the Christian
ethics, for it can never define love as hate, or fellowship as discrimina-
tion. Actually, the government can do all these things-its laws can
and do violate the ethics of Christian love. But when the law is con-
ceived, as is the life of man, as a dynamic unfolding and a constant
striving toward ends and purposes, deflected by sinful deviations and
demonic idolatries, it becomes all the more necessary that the full
force of the judgment of love as well as its redemptive power should
be brought to bear upon the legal order as well as the individual-
they cannot be abstracted from each other. Thus, the theology of law
would insist that the concept of order can be abstract and ambiguous
and can be achieved in ways which would do violence to the essential
nature of man and therefore needs to be reconceived from the per-
spective of creative love.
Similarly, if the law seeks to achieve the goal of freedom, the in-
tricacies of such an end as freedom need to be clarified. For, like order,
freedom can mean many different things, as implied in such varying
notions as laissez-faire and "the truth shall make you free." Freedom,
primarily, is the presupposition of both law and ethics. In this sense,
freedom means that men are capable of alternative modes of behavior.
This is a metaphysical notion characterizing the nature of man's
being. It is metaphysical- freedom which is the presupposition of law,
for the law assumes that human behavior is indeterminate-that man
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faces and makes real choices. It is the function of law, like the func-
tion of ethics, to order behavior or make it determinate. Now if it is
one of the ends of law to make possible human freedom, this freedom,
as an end of law, must differ from the freedom which is the presupposi-
tion of law, for this latter freedom already exists before the law comes
into being and could not therefore be the product of law; one does not
legislate anarchy, for anarchy exists before the law. Freedom, which
the law seeks to bring into being, must therefore be something quite
different from mere laissez-faire. It must be a structured or responsi-
ble freedom. When Christian love informs the jurist, he views freedom
as a mode of behavior which tends to increase rather than decrease the
scope of fellowship or community. It is a mode of behavior which has
a genuine concern for the neighbor and not only for the self. Indeed,
the specific impact of the ethics of love here is to reconceive the mean-
ing of freedom, shifting the focus from self-interest to a genuine
concern for the other, treating the other not only as a means but as
an end, not as a thing but as a person. The argument here is not so
much that the law must be in every sense "Christianized," but that
because law inevitably drives towards ends, these ends must be
clarified not alone by pragmatic concerns and utilitarianism but also
by a more adequate ethics of creative love.
To be sure, there are some limitations upon the efficacy of law. The
jurist can shape the law to follow close upon the lead of morality. But
while the law can secure freedom it cannot make men use it wisely
or responsibly, it can regulate marriage but cannot make partners
love or forgive each other, it can uphold legal rights but cannot thereby
exhaust the full moral relations between parties. As Ames once said,
"The law does not compel active benevolence between man and man.
It is left to one's conscience whether he shall be the good Samaritan
or not."68 Moreover, no formulation of justice ever escapes the further
and constant criticism love brings to the law. This limitation upon law
is inevitable, for theology sees man's moral predicament as a virtually
permanent condition. There is no moment in time when man achieves
perfection, for, as long as he lives, he faces the possibility of choice
and in the process of expressing his freedom he invariably insinuates
his selfish interests into his behavior. Thus, the actual laws even
Christians create partake of the stubborn sin of pride even while
raising conduct to a higher level. Moreover, the law cannot reach into
the sensitive seat of motive, but must stop short of this final moral
dimension. Yet this limitation of law is the outcome of the limitation
of man. Everything depends, then, upon how we deal with this
human limitation. Earlier theories made what appears to be an un-
wise deduction here, for because of the weakness of human nature
68. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. Rzv. 97, 112 (1908).
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they legitimized arbitrary force and refused to see the relevance of
the power of love upon the legal order. To admit the perversity of
man does not alter the higher possibility to which man is called. It
is no wonder that the biblical view is that love is the fulfillment of
the law, for by this it means to say that the fulfillment of law follows
upon the fulfillment of man's essential nature.
